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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ILHAMI TEKMAN; MEHTAP TEKMAN, 
                                                                   Appellants 
 v. 
 
 HERB BERKOWITZ a/k/a Herbert Berkowitz; WILLIAM E. HOWE & CO 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-02932) 
District Judge: Honorable J. William Ditter Jr. 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2015 
 
Before: VANASKIE, NYGAARD, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 






VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Appellants Ilhami and Mehtap Tekman, a married couple, allege that Appellee 
Herb Berkowitz, a tax accountant, violated contractual and professional obligations by 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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failing to disclose evidence of financial misconduct by the Tekmans’ relatives and 
business associates.  The Tekmans sued Berkowitz and his employer, Appellee William 
E. Howe & Co, for professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and loss of consortium.  The District Court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss with 
prejudice.  We will affirm. 
I.  
 Throughout the 1990s, Ilhami “John” Tekman participated with his brother, Nick, 
and father, Ali, in several real-estate investments involving the development and 
operation of motels and hotels in Delaware.1  In 1999, John took a 25% share in one such 
enterprise, Tekman & Company, LLC (T&C), which was co-owned by Nick, Ali, and 
Ali’s wife, Nuriye.  John and Nick initially served as managers of the subject property, a 
“Quality Inn” franchise, but in 2002, they ceded day-to-day operation of the property to 
their brother Nuh, who had received a 25% interest in T&C from his parents. 
 The Amended Complaint alleges that thereafter, at various times between 2002 
and 2010, John’s relatives and business partners diverted T&C’s profits to themselves 
and used T&C’s assets as collateral for other commercial endeavors to which John was 
not a party.  Foremost is the allegation that in September 2008, without John’s 
knowledge, his parents and siblings authorized the use of T&C’s assets as a guarantee for 
                                              
1 Our recitation of the factual background of this appeal is derived from the 
Tekmans’ Amended Complaint.  We accept as true all facts set forth in the Amended 
Complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences from such allegations in favor of the 
complainants.  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Because Ilhami Tekman refers to himself as “John” in the Amended Complaint, we will 
likewise adopt that stylistic practice for ease of reference. 
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an $11 million loan for the construction of a separate hotel project.  John’s signature was 
forged on the relevant documentation, and he received no financial interest in the new 
enterprise. 
 The gravamen of the Amended Complaint is that this wrongdoing should have 
been detected and conveyed to John by Berkowitz, who “at all times material” provided a 
variety of accounting services both to T&C and to John and Mehtap personally.  The 
services “includ[ed], but [were] not limited to preparing tax returns, providing tax 
advice/opinions and preparing financial statements for third-parties (such as lenders) . . . 
.”  App. 19.  John alleges that these relationships were governed by contracts that are 
“believed oral or otherwise in the possession of” Berkowitz and his employer.  App. 25. 
 In “late 2010,” John learned from his former sister-in-law about the 
aforementioned forgery.   App. 21.  John promptly sued his parents and brothers in 
Delaware Chancery Court for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The case went to trial, 
at which Berkowitz testified that he had learned about the forgery of John’s signature in 
June 2010, but did not tell John about it.  Berkowitz also testified that “he was aware as 
early as 2005 that [T&C] was not operating in accordance with standard accounting 
practices.”  App. 22.  The case resulted in a settlement in which John sold his share of the 
business. 
 In December 2011, John and Mehtap filed this lawsuit against Berkowitz and his 
employer, William E. Howe & Co, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia.  Appellees removed the suit to 
federal district court and moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 12(b)(6).  In response, the Tekmans filed an Amended Complaint asserting 
that Berkowitz’s failure to detect and disclose the aforementioned misconduct constituted 
professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.2  Appellees 
again moved to dismiss.  In April 2014, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss 
with prejudice.  The Tekmans timely appealed. 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review of a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo.  Fowler 
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8 requires that a plaintiff come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  The claim must have “facial plausibility,” 
which exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient.  See 
id. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 
with nothing more than conclusions.”). 
                                              
2 The Amended Complaint also included a separate claim on behalf of Mehtap for 
loss of consortium, which the Tekmans do not address on appeal. 
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III.  
 The Tekmans challenge the District Court’s dismissal of their claims on 
substantive grounds, as well as the Court’s denial of leave to file a second amended 
complaint.  We will address the claims sequentially. 
A. Negligence 
 Under Pennsylvania law, an accountant’s breach of a professional duty (i.e., 
malpractice) sounds in tort as an action for negligence.  Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity 
Bank, 479 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).  The elements of a negligence claim 
include the existence of a duty, breach, causation, and injury.  Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 
458, 461 (Pa. 1998).   
 When the accountant has an express service contract, the scope of the duty is 
defined primarily by the terms of contract.  See Robert Wooler Co., 479 A.2d at 1031 
(citing O’Neill v. Atlas Auto. Fin. Corp., 11 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940)); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A cmt. c.3  An accountant must then provide the 
contracted-for services with the “skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of 
that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 299A.  And aside from establishing the substantive content of the duty at issue, 
                                              
3 A breach of contract claim, too, may exist based on a professional’s “failure to 
fulfill his or her contractual duty to provide the agreed upon [professional] services in a 
manner consistent with the profession at large.”  Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 694 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002).  See also Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723, 729–30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2003) (“Nothing in our law insulates accountants or other professionals from being sued 
in contract for a failure to properly perform professional services.”).  The Tekmans bring 
a claim for breach of contract, which we address below.   
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a plaintiff must also allege that he or she was owed that duty as a matter of privity of 
contract with the professional defendant.  See Tredennick v. Bone, 647 F. Supp. 2d 495, 
500 (W.D. Pa. 2007).    
 The Tekmans do not claim that Berkowitz failed to perform any specific 
contracted-for service here—nor could they, given the Amended Complaint’s failure to 
cite any particular contractual language.  Instead they note that when an accountant, in 
the course of his or her duties, discovers “suspicious circumstances” such as glaring 
bookkeeping irregularities, he or she is obligated to investigate further and then bring the 
matter to the attention of the client.  Robert Wooler Co., 479 A.2d at 1032.  The Tekmans 
contend that Berkowitz “knew or should have known” that, among other things, T&C’s 
books contained evidence of backdated entries, erroneously reported transactions, 
improper distributions, and misused assets—and that Berkowitz in turn should have 
disclosed this information to John.  App. 22.  Supporting this claim is Berkowitz’s 
admission that “he was aware as early as 2005 that [T&C] was not operating in 
accordance with standard accounting practices.”  Id. 
 Like the District Court, we conclude the Amended Complaint fails to state a viable 
negligence claim.  As portrayed in the Amended Complaint, the scope of Berkowitz’s 
contractual duties—whether to T&C as a business entity or to John personally—is largely 
a matter of guesswork.  The Amended Complaint does not specify whether Berkowitz 
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provided auditing or other attestation services,4 or had first-hand exposure to any of the 
internal corporate documents from which wrongdoing may have been apparent.  The 
mere fact that Berkowitz prepared tax returns and other financial statements for T&C, 
without more, is not enough to permit the inference that he knew (or should have known) 
of the various acts of corporate malfeasance allegedly perpetrated by John’s business 
partners.  And to the extent that Berkowitz was obligated to disclose that T&C was not 
following standard accounting practices, that duty was owed not to John, but to T&C as a 
corporate entity.  The Tekmans provide no authority to suggest that John, as a minority 
stakeholder in T&C, is himself able to sue for breach of a duty owed to T&C by its own 
accountant.  See In re Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Secs. Litig., 892 F. Supp. 676, 694 (W.D. Pa. 
1995) (finding that stockholders and directors of a corporation were not in privity with 
corporation’s accountant for purposes of negligence claims). 
 The Tekmans also claim that Berkowitz was negligent in failing to disclose the 
forgery of John’s signature immediately after he learned of it in June 2010.  We assume 
“arguendo” that Berkowitz, as John’s tax accountant, did have a professional duty to tell 
John about the forgery.  Even so, it does not follow that Berkowitz’s breach of that duty 
caused any non-speculative harm.  See Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Pa. 
1998) (requiring “proof of actual loss rather than a breach of a professional duty causing 
only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm”).  As of August 
                                              
4 We have in other cases described the various auditing services that accountants 
may be hired to provide.  See, e.g.,  Otto v. Pa. State Educ. Assoc.-NEA, 330 F.3d 125, 
133–34 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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2010, less than two months after Berkowitz learned of the forgery, John himself 
discovered the deed through other channels and sued the parties responsible.  The 
Tekmans have not alleged, nor can we infer, that Berkowitz's failure to disclose the 
forgery to them during this time caused them any actual harm. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count One of the 
Amended Complaint. 
B. Breach of Contract 
 Count Two alleges that Berkowitz breached an “agreement to provide competent, 
honest, undivided, loyal and effective accounting services . . . .”  App. 25.  “A claim for 
breach of contract exists where it can be shown that there was a contract, a breach of a 
duty imposed by that contract and damages that resulted from the breach.”  Koken, 825 
A.2d at 729 (citing Gen. State Auth. v. Coleman Cable & Wire Co., 365 A.2d 1347, 1349 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976)).  The plaintiff must allege “basic elements” of a contract, 
including “an offer, acceptance and consideration.”  Id. (quoting Hatbob v. Brown, 575 
A.2d 607, 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).  
 As described above, the most that the Tekmans allege about the parties’ 
contractual relationship here is that “the agreement between the parties is believed oral or 
otherwise in the possession of” Berkowitz and his employer.  App. 25.  The Amended 
Complaint does not allege which accounting services Berkowitz performed for any 
particular client, when he performed them, or what the oral or written contract might have 
provided.  Instead, we are left only with the claim that Berkowitz performed a vague 
assortment of accounting duties for T&C and the Tekmans over an indeterminate span of 
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nearly ten years.  These amorphous allegations do not permit a reasonable inference that 
Berkowitz breached a duty imposed by contract. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count Two of 
the Amended Complaint.5 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 Under Pennsylvania law, a professional bears a fiduciary duty to his client only 
where the relationship is “confidential” as a matter of fact or law.  eToll, Inc. v. 
Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 21-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  A confidential 
relationship “is marked by such a disparity in position that the inferior party places 
complete trust in the superior party’s advice and seeks no other counsel, so as to give rise 
to a potential abuse of power.”  Id. at 23.   “[A]ccountant-client relationships have not 
been deemed to be per se confidential in the sense of generating attendant fiduciary 
duties.”  Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 A.3d 1202, 1210 n.7 (Pa. 2012).  The fiduciary 
status of a tax accountant in particular is a fact-intensive question.  Id. at 1210.  “There is 
a crucial distinction between surrendering control of one’s affairs to a fiduciary or 
confidant or party in a position to exercise undue influence and entering into an arms 
length commercial agreement, however important its performance may be to the success 
of one’s business.” eToll, 811 A.2d at 23. 
                                              
5 The Tekmans also allege a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
A claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, cannot stand 
as a cause of action independent from a breach of contract claim.  As noted in JHE, Inc. 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 2002 WL 1018941, at *7 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 17, 2002), “a 
breach of the covenant of good faith is nothing more than a breach of contract claim and  
. . . separate causes of action cannot be maintained for each, even in the alternative.” 
10 
 As explained by the District Court, the Amended Complaint alleges no facts from 
which one could reasonably infer that the Tekmans employed Berkowitz in a confidential 
capacity, rather than as part of an arm’s-length commercial relationship.  The Tekmans 
do not allege that they relied on Berkowitz to any unusual extent in their personal 
dealings, or that they surrendered any degree of control over T&C to Berkowitz.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count Three of the 
Amended Complaint. 
D. Leave to Amend 
 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, “[t]he court should freely give leave [to 
amend a complaint] when justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  We review 
denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., 
729 F.3d 357, 367 (3d Cir. 2013).  A district court may deny leave to amend on the basis 
of “undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, or futility,” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 
F.3d 212, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Here, the District Court concluded that “[t]he pleading defects were pointed out to 
[the Tekmans] by [Appellees’] motion to dismiss, yet neither their amended complaint 
nor their memorandum of law filed in response to [Appellees’] motion to dismiss 
included any additional facts that would support their claims.”  App. 16.  The record 
supports the District Court’s implicit conclusion that granting leave to amend would be 
futile.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the case with prejudice. 
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IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment entered on 
April 29, 2014. 
